After the disaster at Camden the previous August, Nathanael Greene took command of the Southern Army and made an unconventional decision: he split his already small force, sending Daniel Morgan with a detachment into the South Carolina backcountry to threaten British supply lines and rally local militia. Cornwallis answered by detaching his most feared subordinate, Banastre Tarleton, to run Morgan down. Morgan chose his ground at a cattle-grazing common called the Cowpens and built a battle plan around the one resource every other American commander distrusted: militia. Morgan's own report on what happened survives complete, quoted word for word inside Greene's letter to Washington written a week later.
Morgan abandoned his camp once he learned Tarleton's force was moving to dislodge him, and on the evening of January 16 took a position seven miles from a ford on the Broad River, a choice that put a flooded river directly at his army's back. He explained the decision plainly in his own report.
My former Position subjected me at once to the Operations of Lord Cornwallis and Colonel Tarlton, and in Case of a Defeat my Retreat might easily have been cut off. My Situation at the Cowpens enabled me to improve any Advantages I might gain, and to provide better for my own Security, should I be unfortunate. These Reasons induced me to take this Post, notwithstanding it had the Appearance of a Retreat.
With no avenue of retreat, Morgan's militia had no choice but to stand and fight, which was exactly the design. He arranged his force in three lines: skirmishing riflemen out front, militia under Andrew Pickens behind them with orders to fire twice and fall back rather than hold, and his Continental regulars under John Eager Howard forming the final line, with William Washington's cavalry held in reserve.
Tarleton attacked head-on at dawn, exactly as Morgan had anticipated. The militia fired their volleys and withdrew as planned, the British mistook the orderly retreat for a rout, and Howard's regulars absorbed the resulting charge before counterattacking with the bayonet.
We retired in good order about 50 Paces, formed, advanced on the Enemy and gave them a brisk Fire, which threw them into Disorder. Lt Colonel Howard observing this gave orders for the Line to charge Bayonets, which was done with such address that the Enemy fled with the utmost Precipitation. Lt Colonel Washington discovering that the Cavalry were cutting down our Riflemen on the left charged them with such Firmness as obliged them to retire in Confusion. The Enemy were entirely routed, and the Persuit continued for upwards of 20 Miles.
Morgan reported the full results in the same letter: roughly 800 Americans against more than a thousand British regulars, American losses of 12 killed and 60 wounded against British losses of over 100 killed, 200 wounded, and more than 500 captured, along with two field pieces, two regimental standards, 800 muskets, and the army's wagons and supplies.
Greene forwarded Morgan's full report to Washington within days, attaching his own assessment of the army's broader situation.
The victory was compleat, and the action glorious. I am unhappy that the distressed situation of this Army will not admit of our improving the advantage we have gained. But I hope it has given the enemy a check that will prevent their advancing for some days.
Cowpens cost Cornwallis roughly a quarter of his army in the South in a single morning, and the British general responded by burning his own baggage train to give chase to Greene's combined force, a pursuit that would carry both armies north into the campaign that ended at Guilford Courthouse two months later.
If you learned something new or just enjoyed the content, please share it and follow along on X and Substack.